Strategic Planning of Military Operationsis carried out by the headquarters of the armies on the basis of several basic premises. These include an indispensable condition for the commanders to be aware of the operational situation and the uninterrupted exchange of information. In the event of non-compliance with any of these two criteria, even the most powerful army in the world, armed with a huge amount of modern technology and equipped with selective soldiers, turns into a helpless mob, laden with scrap heaps. The acquisition and transmission of information is currently carried out by means of reconnaissance, detection and communication. It's every strategist who dreams of disabling the enemy's radar and destroying his communications. This can be done with the means and methods of electronic warfare (EW).
Early methods of electronic countermeasures
As soon as electronics appeared, she starteddefense departments. The advantages of wireless communication, invented by Popov, instantly appreciated the Imperial Russian Navy. During the First World War, ethereal reception and transmission of information became commonplace. At the same time, the first methods of electronic warfare appeared, which were still timid and not very effective. To create interference, airplanes and airships were thrown off the height of the cut aluminum foil, which created obstacles to the passage of radio waves. Of course, this method had many shortcomings, it acted for a short time and completely the communication channel did not overlap. In 1914-1918, another important method of REB, widespread even in our time, became widespread. The communications and reconnaissance missions were tasked with intercepting the enemy's air messages. Information was quickly learned to encrypt, but even the assessment of the degree of intensity of the radio exchange allowed staff analysts to judge a lot.
The role of information in World War II
After the outbreak of World War IIthe electronic warfare entered a new phase of development. The power of submarines and aircraft of Hitler's Germany required effective confrontation. In Britain and the US, countries facing the problem of the security of Atlantic communications, serious work began on the creation of means for the long-range detection of surface and air targets, in particular, bombers and FAA missiles. The question was also acute about the possibility of deciphering reports of German submariners. Despite the impressive work of mathematical analysts and the availability of some achievements, the electronic warfare became effective only after the seizure of the (accidental) secret machine of Engim. The real value of the research in the field of disinformation and the interruption of the information structure of Germany during the Second World War did not reach, but experience accumulated.
The army as a living organism
During the Cold War, radio electronicstruggle began to take shape, close to the modern view of them. The armed forces, if they are likened to their living organism, have sensory organs, brain and power bodies, directly carrying out fire influence on the enemy. The "ears" and "eyes" of the army are means of monitoring, detecting and recognizing objects that can pose a security threat to the tactical or strategic level. The function of the brain is performed by the headquarters. From it, on the thin "nerves" of communication channels, military orders receive orders mandatory for execution. Various measures are being taken to protect the whole complex system, but it remains vulnerable. First, the enemy always seeks to disrupt control by destroying headquarters. Its second goal is to hit the means of information support (posts of radar and early detection). Third, when the communication channels are broken, the control system loses its functionality. The modern electronic warfare system goes beyond these three tasks and often works much harder.
It's no secret that the US military budget in monetary termsexpression is many times greater than Russian. To successfully confront a possible threat to our country, we have to take asymmetric measures, ensuring an adequate level of security with less expensive means. The effectiveness of means of protection is determined by high-tech solutions that create technical conditions for causing the greatest damage to the aggressor by concentrating efforts on his vulnerable areas.
In the Russian Federation, one of the leadingorganizations engaged in the development of electronic warfare means is KRET (Concern "Radioelectronic Technologies"). The basis for creating means of suppressing the activity of a probable enemy is a certain philosophical concept. For successful functioning the system should determine the priority directions of work at various stages of the development of the military conflict.
What is non-energy interference?
At the present stage, the creation of a universalinterference that completely excludes information exchange is almost impossible. A much more effective measure of resistance may be interception of a signal, its decoding and transfer to the enemy in a distorted form. Such a system of electronic warfare creates an effect that has been called by experts "non-energy interference". Its operation can lead to complete disorganization of the management of hostile armed forces, and, as a result, to their complete destruction. This method, according to some sources, was already used during the Middle East conflicts, but in the late sixties and early seventies the element base of the EW equipment did not allow achieving high efficiency. Intervention in the management of the enemy's military units was carried out "in manual mode". Today, at the disposal of Russian electronic warfare units there are digital technologies.
Means of tactical designation
In addition to strategic issues, the troops,located at the forefront, are forced to solve tactical tasks. Aircraft must fly over enemy positions, protected by air defense. Is it possible to provide them with an unhindered passage over defensive lines? The episode that took place during naval exercises in the Black Sea (April 2014), practically proves that modern Russian electronic warfare means provide a high probability of invulnerability of aircraft, even if their characteristics today are no longer among the most progressive.
The Ministry of Defense modestly refrains fromcomments, but the reaction of the American side speaks volumes. Normal - in the conditions of maneuvers - the flight of the ship "Donald Cook" by the unarmed Su-24 bomber led to the abandonment of all guidance equipment. This is how the small-scale electronic warfare complex "Khibiny" operates.
This system, named after the mountain range onKola Peninsula, externally is a cylindrical container suspended from a standard military aircraft pylon. The idea of creating a means of information counteraction arose in the second half of the seventies. Defensive topics were given to KNIRTI (Kaluga Research Radio Engineering Institute). The complex of electronic warfare conceptually consisted of two blocks, one of which ("Proran") was responsible for reconnaissance functions, and the other ("Regatta") exposed active interference. The work ended well in 1980.
The modules were intended for installation on the frontfighter Su-27. The Russian complex of electronic warfare "Khibiny" was the result of combining the functions of both units and ensuring their coordinated work together with the airborne equipment of the aircraft.
Purpose of the complex
The device L-175V ("Khibiny") is designed to perform several functions, collectively defined as radio-electronic suppression of the air defense assets of the enemy.
The first task, which he had to solve incombat conditions, is to record the probing signal of the source of irradiation. Then the received signal is distorted in order to make it difficult to detect the carrier aircraft. In addition, the device creates conditions for the appearance of false targets on the radar screen, complicates the determination of range and coordinates, and worsens other recognition indicators.
Problems that arise in enemy air defense systems become so large that it is not necessary to talk about the effectiveness of their work.
Modernization of the complex "Khibiny"
In the time that has passed since the adoption of theproducts L-175V, the scheme of the device was subjected to numerous changes, aimed at increasing technical parameters and reducing weight and size. Improvement continues today, the subtleties are kept secret, but it is known that the newest electronic warfare complex can implement group defense of aircraft from the impact of antiaircraft missile complexes of the likely enemy, both existing and promising ones. Modular design implies the possibility of increasing the power and information capabilities, depending on the requirements of the tactical situation. In the development of the device, not only the current state of the air defense systems of the probable enemy was taken into account, but also the anticipation of the possibilities for their development in the near future (for the period up to 2025).
The troops of electronic warfare of the RussianThe federations have recently received four mobile radar systems, Krasuha-4. They are secret, despite the fact that land-based stationary systems of a similar designation Krasuha-2 have already been in operation in military units since 2009.
It is known that mobile complexes are createdRostov Research Institute "Gradient", produced by Nizhny Novgorod NPO "Kvant" and mounted on the chassis of the BAZ-6910-022 (four-axle, cross-country). According to its principle of operation, the newest Russian electronic warfare complex Krasukha is an active-passive system combining the possibilities of reradiation of electromagnetic fields created by early warning antennas (including AWACS) and the creation of active directed jammers. The lack of technical details did not prevent the infiltration of information about the tremendous capabilities of the REB complex in the media, whose work "drives the control systems of unmanned aerial vehicles and the missile guidance units of the likely enemy mad."
What is hidden behind the shroud of mystery
For quite understandable reasons, information abouttechnical characteristics of the latest Russian electronic countermeasures systems are kept secret. Other countries also are not in a hurry to share secrets in the field of similar developments, which, of course, are underway. However, it is still possible to judge the degree of combat readiness of this or that defense technology on the basis of indirect indications. Unlike nuclear strategic missiles, the effectiveness of which is better only to guess and to perform a speculative analysis, the EW equipment can be tested under the conditions closest to combat ones, and even against quite real, if possible, opponents, as happened in April 2014. So far, there is reason to believe that the Russian troops of electronic warfare in case of what will not let you down.